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ABSTRACT
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or “the Act”) is
the primary governing body of law on immigration in the United
States.  The INA establishes the procedures for removing nonci-
tizens from the country.
To initiate removal proceedings, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) serves a Notice to Appear (NTA) on a noncitizen
deemed to be removable.  The INA specifies information to be con-
tained in the NTA, including the hearing date and location.  A form
of relief from removal that noncitizens may apply for is cancellation
of removal, which is contingent on factors such as continuous resi-
dence in the United States for a certain period of time.  Once the
DHS serves a noncitizen with an NTA, however, the noncitizen’s
continuous residence is suspended based on a provision in the INA
called the “stop-time” rule.
Courts are split on whether the NTA must contain all informa-
tion listed in the INA to trigger the stop-time rule.  Most circuits,
upon determining that the INA is ambiguous on this point and in
deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), have held
that the NTA need not contain the hearing date and location.  The
Third Circuit is the only circuit that has found the INA unambigu-
ous, holding that the INA plainly requires the NTA to contain all
information to trigger the stop-time rule.
This Comment first provides an overview of the INA, focusing
on removal proceedings.  This Comment then discusses the circuit
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split on whether an NTA lacking information listed in the INA trig-
gers the stop-time rule.  This Comment concludes that an NTA
must contain all information specified in the INA, consistent with
the plain meaning of the text, statutory context, and policy
considerations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Substantial numbers of noncitizens seek admission into the
United States annually.1  The Immigration and Nationality Act2
(INA or “the Act”) places restrictions on the admissibility of these
applicants, establishing grounds for excluding certain noncitizens.3
Similarly, admitted noncitizens who are determined to be deport-
able based on deportation provisions4 of the INA face removal
from the United States.5
In Matter of Camarillo,6 in 2005, the government charged
Judith Elma Camarillo with alien smuggling as a basis for removal
from the country.7  Camarillo, a Guatemalan citizen, had been re-
siding as a lawful permanent resident in the United States since
2000.8  The charging document, or Notice to Appear (“NTA”), indi-
cated that the hearing time was yet to be determined, and it was not
until two years later in 2007 that Camarillo was eventually notified
of her hearing date.9  Through the ensuing removal proceedings
and subsequent appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or
“the Board”)10 ultimately found Camarillo ineligible for cancella-
tion of removal, a form of relief that would allow her to stay in the
1. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 2015
63 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigra
tion_Statistics_2015.pdf.
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
3. Id. § 1182.  Admission refers to “the lawful entry of [a noncitizen] into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Id.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).  Examples of grounds for inadmissibility include health-related
and criminal grounds. Id. § 1182.
4. Id. § 1227.  Deportation involves removing a noncitizen, already within and
admitted to the United States, based on certain grounds such as criminal and na-
tional security grounds. Id.
5. Id. § 1229a(a).
6. Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (B.I.A. 2011).
7. Id. at 644.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 644–45.
10. The Board of Immigration Appeals, consisting of 17 members appointed
by the Attorney General, serves as the appellate body within the Department of
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United States.11  The Board found that she had not met the statu-
tory requirement of seven years of continuous residence under the
INA,12 beginning from when she became a lawful permanent resi-
dent in 2000 to when she was served with the NTA in 2005—even if
the NTA did not specify the hearing date and time.13  This finding
was based on the INA’s “stop-time” rule, which establishes that ser-
vice of an NTA on a noncitizen suspends the noncitizen’s continu-
ous residence period for purposes of determining eligibility for
cancellation of removal.14  The BIA concluded in Camarillo that an
NTA could still trigger the stop-time rule, regardless of whether the
NTA included the hearing date and time.15
Other circuits followed suit, deferring to the BIA’s interpreta-
tion of the INA.16  Five years after the Camarillo decision, in 2016,
the Third Circuit departed from the reasoning of the majority of
circuits, instead holding that the NTA must contain all the informa-
tion plainly listed under the INA in order to trigger the stop-time
rule and suspend a noncitizen’s continuous-residence period.17
This Comment will examine the circuit split on the issue of
whether an NTA must contain all of the listed information specified
in the INA.18  Part II of this Comment will first provide an overview
of the INA,19 focusing on the procedure for removing eligible
noncitizens20 and the eligibility of these noncitizens for relief.21
Part II will also introduce the stop-time rule of the INA, explaining
how the provision affects noncitizens’ eligibility for relief.22  Finally,
Part II will present the circuit split on the issue of whether an NTA
must contain all of the information listed in the INA to trigger the
stop-time rule, discussing the BIA’s interpretation,23 how the ma-
jority of federal circuit courts have deferred to the BIA’s interpre-
Justice responsible for reviewing administrative adjudications in certain classes of
proceedings, such as removal and asylum.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2017).
11. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 645.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012).
13. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 645.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d).
15. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 651.
16. See infra Part II.E.2.
17. See infra Part II.E.3.
18. See infra Part II.E.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part II.D.
23. See infra Part II.E.1.
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tation,24 and how the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reached a
divergent result.25
Next, Part III of this Comment will present arguments consis-
tent with the Third Circuit’s position that an NTA, in order to trig-
ger the stop-time rule and end a noncitizen’s period of continuous
residence in the United States, must contain all the information
specified in the INA.26  This comports with the plain text of the
specific provisions at issue;27 statutory context, including other por-
tions of the statute28 and legislative intent;29 and policy
considerations.30
Part IV will conclude that an NTA must contain all the infor-
mation plainly listed in the INA in order to trigger the stop-time
rule.31
II. BACKGROUND
A. Immigration and Nationality Act
1. Overview of the INA
Enacted in 1952, the INA is, and has been, the primary gov-
erning body of law on immigration within the United States.32  The
INA establishes the processes through which a noncitizen can be-
come a lawful permanent resident33 (“LPR”) and, eventually, a citi-
zen.34  Additionally, the INA also establishes the processes for
rescinding a granted petition for LPR status,35 determining whether
24. See infra Part II.E.2.
25. See infra Part II.E.3.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. See infra Part III.B.1.
29. See infra Part III.B.2.
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act (last updated Sept. 10,
2013); Liliana Zaragoza, Note, Delimiting Limitations: Does the Immigration and
Nationality Act Impose a Statute of Limitations on Noncitizen Removal Proceed-
ings?, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1330 (2012).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012).  Lawful permanent residents are noncitizens that
have been “lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws.” Id.
§ 1101(a)(20).  Lawful permanent residents (also known as “green card” holders)
enjoy privileges such as working without special restrictions, owning property, and
applying to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements. Lawful Per-
manent Residents, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-
statistics/lawful-permanent-residents (last published Aug. 4, 2017).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1427.
35. Id. § 1256.
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noncitizens36 should be precluded from entering or staying in the
United States,37 and removing noncitizens from the United States
on certain grounds.38
2. 1996 Amendments to the INA
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”),39 which drastically
modified the INA and immigration law.40  Under IIRIRA, Con-
gress established a new form of relief called cancellation of re-
moval,41 codified at § 240A of the INA,42 which replaced the relief
provided through suspension of deportation43 and waiver of
deportation.44
In enacting this provision on cancellation of removal,45 Con-
gress “narrowed the class of aliens who could qualify for relief.”46
A non-LPR must now have ten years of continuous physical pres-
ence in the country, as opposed to the seven years previously re-
quired for suspension of deportation.47  Additionally, to qualify for
36. Noncitizens, or aliens, are persons that are not citizens or nationals of the
United States. Id. § 1101(a)(3).
37. Id. § 1227(a); id. § 1182(a).
38. Id. § 1229a.
39. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
40. See Paul B. Hunker III, Cancellation of Removal or Cancellation of Relief?
– The 1996 IIRIRA Amendments: A Review and Critique of Section 240A(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1 (2000).
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
43. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-624 (1996).  To qualify for suspension of depor-
tation, a non-LPR must show:  a) physical presence in the United States for a con-
tinuous period of at least seven years (or ten years, depending on the basis of
deportation); b) good moral character during that period; and c) that deportation
would result in extreme hardship (or exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,
depending on the basis of deportation) to the alien or a spouse, parent, or child
who is a citizen or permanent resident.  8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed
1996).
44. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 304(b),
110 Stat. 3009–597.  A waiver of deportation, or section 212(c) waiver, was availa-
ble to an LPR denied admission and seeking to return to a lawful domicile of seven
consecutive years in the United States, suggesting that “Congress intended to ben-
efit aliens who had significant ties to this country.”  Elwin Griffith, The Road Be-
tween the Section 212(c) Waiver and Cancellation of Removal Under Section 240a
of the Immigration and Nationality Act—the Impact of the 1996 Reform Legislation,
12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 66 (1997); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).
45. See infra Part II.C.
46. In Re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58 (B.I.A. 2001).
47. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)
(2012).
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relief, the non-LPR now has to establish “exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship,” rather than merely “extreme
hardship.”48
IIRIRA also introduced the stop-time rule, which affects the
eligibility of a noncitizen, whether an LPR or a non-LPR, to apply
for relief from being removed from the United States.49  Specifi-
cally, the stop-time rule affects the requirement that a noncitizen
must have continuously resided in the United States for seven or
ten years (depending on status as an LPR or non-LPR).50  Under
the stop-time rule, a noncitizen’s period of continuous residence
ends when the noncitizen is served with a Notice to Appear51 or
when he commits certain acts rendering him inadmissible or
deportable.52
B. Navigating the Immigration System
1. Notice to Appear
An NTA marks the beginning of a noncitizen’s path through
the Immigration Courts.53  Once the Department of Homeland Se-
curity54 (DHS) serves the noncitizen with an NTA, he or she is
48. Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 58 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)); 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  This same “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” stan-
dard previously applied only to non-LPRs who were deportable for certain crimi-
nal convictions, but now encompasses all non-LPRs applying for cancellation of
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1994) (repealed 1996).  The BIA noted that
“although many of the factors that were considered in assessing ‘extreme hardship’
. . . should also be considered in evaluating ‘exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship,’ an applicant for cancellation of removal must demonstrate hardship be-
yond that which has historically been required in . . . cases involving the ‘extreme
hardship’ standard.” Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 56.
49. See infra Part II.D.
50. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), 1229b(b).
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d).
53. See id. § 1229(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2017).
54. DHS, established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is primarily re-
sponsible for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States and reducing the
vulnerability of United States to Terrorism.  6 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).  DHS enforces
immigration laws and administers immigration and naturalization benefits. EXEC.
OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., B.I.A. PRACTICE MANUAL 2 (2015), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/file/431306/download.  DHS assumed the responsibilities of
the now-abolished Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), with immigra-
tion functions distributed across three units, namely Customs and Border Protec-
tion, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Citizenship and Immigration
Services. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 211, 251, 271.
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placed in removal proceedings,55 which involve hearings before an
immigration judge.56
Immigration officers performing inspections of arriving nonci-
tizens at points of entry, as well as other duly authorized officers of
the DHS, have the authority to issue NTAs to noncitizens.57  Nonci-
tizens encounter DHS officers under various circumstances, such as
“at a point of entry into the country, through referral to the DHS
by local law enforcement after an arrest or criminal conviction, dur-
ing a worksite raid, or during the process of applying for certain
immigration benefits with DHS.”58
After issuing the NTA, the DHS officer files the NTA to vest
jurisdiction with an immigration judge.59  Filing the NTA with the
Immigration Court commences the removal proceeding, and the
noncitizen must then appear before an immigration judge.60
2. Removal Proceedings
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an
agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ),61 administers im-
migration laws and adjudicates immigration cases through the Im-
migration Courts.62  Removal hearings are civil administrative
proceedings63 over which an immigration judge presides64 and de-
cides the inadmissibility or deportability of a noncitizen.65  The im-
migration judge has the authority to issue subpoenas ordering the
attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence, examine and
cross-examine the noncitizen and any witnesses, and hold individu-
als in contempt of court.66  An Immigration and Customs Enforce-
55. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
56. See id.  Immigration judges are attorneys appointed by the Attorney Gen-
eral as administrative judges to conduct certain proceedings, including removal
proceedings.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).
57. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1.
58. Christen Chapman, Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1529, 1541 (2011).
59. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).
61. The DOJ is the primary federal criminal investigation and enforcement
agency. About DOJ, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/about (last visited
Sept. 3, 2017).
62. EOIR at a Glance, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.
gov/eoir/eoir-at-a-glance (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
63. Matter of Lam, 14 I. & N. Dec. 168, 172 (B.I.A. 1972).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1229a(b)(1).
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ment (ICE)67 attorney represents the government in removal
hearings and presents evidence on the noncitizen’s removability.68
Removal hearings focus predominantly on two issues:  a) the re-
movability of the noncitizen, and b) the eligibility of the noncitizen
for relief from removal.69
a. Removability
A noncitizen is deemed removable based on a determination
of inadmissibility under § 1182 of the INA or deportability under
§ 1227 of the INA.70  Removal hearings begin with a master calen-
dar hearing, followed by an individual merits hearing.71  The master
calendar hearing is “similar to a criminal arraignment”72 as the im-
migration judge ensures the noncitizen understands his or her al-
leged immigration law violations73 and advises the noncitizen of his
or her right to representation.74  The master calendar hearing func-
tions to “dispose of cases . . . that are susceptible to summary dispo-
sition”75 (e.g., voluntary departure76) and, in cases where the
noncitizen disputes his or her removability and/or wishes to apply
for relief,77 to prepare and schedule those cases for the individual
merits hearing.78
Whether or not the noncitizen contests his or her removability,
the immigration judge must inform the noncitizen of his or her ap-
parent eligibility for relief.79  At the end of the master calendar
hearing, the immigration judge schedules an individual merits hear-
ing for the noncitizen and government to present the merits of the
case with respect to removability and relief.80
67. ICE is an agency within the DHS responsible for enforcing federal laws in
border control, detention and removal, investigations, and inspections.  6 U.S.C.
§ 251 (2012).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) (2017).
69. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1542.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2).
71. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., supra note 62.
72. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1542–43.
73. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., supra note 62.
74. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a) (2017).
75.  EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE MASTER CALENDAR 1, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/
988051/download (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (2012).
77. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1543.
78. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., supra note 75, at 1.
79. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2).
80. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., supra note 62.
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The individual merits hearing functions as the “trial stage of
the removal hearing.”81  If the noncitizen disputes his or her remov-
ability based on the government’s allegations, the government
bears the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the admitted noncitizen is deportable.82
b. Relief
The outcome of most removal hearings depends on the nonci-
tizen’s eligibility for relief83 because proving the alleged violations
is “relatively easy for the government.”84  A noncitizen applying for
relief bears the burden of proof to establish that he or she satisfies
the requirements for eligibility and “merits a favorable exercise of
discretion.”85  Asylum and cancellation of removal, both of which
are established by statute and have “a long history within the
United States’ immigration context,” are the two most commonly
requested forms of discretionary relief.86
C. Cancellation of Removal
Cancellation of removal is a form of relief available to both
LPRs and non-LPRs87 deemed to be removable (i.e., inadmissible
or deportable).88  For non-LPRs, relief may be available to those
who have “established affiliation” in the United States.89  This relief
may be granted if the non-LPR:
81. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1544.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (2012).
83. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., supra note 62.
84. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1545.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A).
86. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1545.
87. Requirements for cancellation of removal differ between LPRs and non-
LPRs.  For LPRs, relief may be available if the LPR:
1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not
less than 5 years,
2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having
been admitted in any status, and
3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
88. Id. §§ 1229b(a), 1229b(b).
89. Margaret H. Taylor, What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation? Rational-
izing Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J.L.
& POL. 527, 529 (2015) (quoting HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:
THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
80–114 (1st ed. 2006)) (recognizing that certain noncitizens have sunk roots or “es-
tablished affiliation” in the United States).  This affiliation is based on the contri-
butions of certain noncitizens as productive members of the community, e.g., work,
taxes, civic participation.  Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside
the Law and the Idea of Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 376
(2012).
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1) has been physically present in the United States for a continu-
ous period of not less than ten years immediately preceding the
date of such application;
2) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
3) has not been convicted of an offense under [§§] 1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) . . . and;
4) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child,
who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.90
Cancellation of removal is based on a determination by Con-
gress that “some noncitizens should be allowed to remain in the
United States, despite being technically deportable, because they
possess qualities desirable in residents and because deportation
would create an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship on the
persons whom the noncitizen left behind in the United States.”91
Cancellation of removal is the most generous form of relief
available to a noncitizen,92 given that a successful applicant not only
wins his or her deportation case, but, in the case of non-LPRs, the
government will also adjust the non-LPR’s status to that of an
LPR.93  Additionally, a successful applicant later receives the op-
portunity for naturalization when the applicant meets the statutory
requirements.94  Because cancellation of removal is such a generous
form of relief, it is available in only “truly exceptional cases.”95
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  The prohibited convictions relate to offenses such
as crimes involving moral turpitude and controlled substances, as well as falsifica-
tion of documents. Id. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3).
91. Chapman, supra note 58, at 1548 (citing E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798–1965, 558–59, 574 (1981)).
92. Id.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
94. Id. § 1427.  Naturalization refers to “conferring of nationality of a state
upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever. Id. § 1101(a)(23).  Statutory
requirements for naturalization include, among others, continuous permanent resi-
dence within the United States for at least five years after being lawfully admitted
for permanent residence; good moral character; an understanding of the English
language; and a knowledge of the fundamentals of the history and form of govern-
ment of the United States. Id. §§ 1423, 1427.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 213–14 (1996).  For example, in In Re Gonzalez
Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002), the BIA granted cancellation of re-
moval to a Mexican native who was a single mother and who served as the sole
provider for her United States citizen children (ages 5, 8, 11, and 12). Gonzalez
Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 467.  The noncitizen’s entire immediate family was
lawfully residing in the United States, and so she would be unable to receive any
assistance in caring for her children if compelled to return to Mexico. Id.  Addi-
tionally, her children were unfamiliar with the Spanish language, which would re-
sult in further hardship. Id.  The BIA stated that these factors “combine[d] to
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Cancellation of removal is also a discretionary form of relief, in
which an immigration judge may cancel the removal of a qualified
individual.96  In other words, even if the noncitizen meets all of the
statutory requirements for eligibility, the immigration judge is not
obligated to cancel removal.97
D. Stop-Time Rule
A particular provision within the INA referred to as the stop-
time rule affects the continuous residence requirement and, ulti-
mately, eligibility for cancellation of removal.98  The portion of the
INA referred to as the stop-time rule states:
[A]ny period of continuous residence or continuous physical
presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when
the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this
title, or . . . when the alien has committed an offense referred to
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissi-
ble to the United States . . . .99
Simply put, continuous residence ends when a noncitizen is
served an NTA or when he commits certain acts rendering him
inadmissible or deportable, whichever comes first.100
The § 1229(a) provision invoked in the stop-time rule indicates
that the written notice given to the alien to initiate removal pro-
ceedings must specify information such as the nature of the pro-
ceedings against the alien and the time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.101
E. Circuit Split Regarding NTA
The United States Courts of Appeals have recently split on
whether an NTA which does not contain all the information speci-
render the hardship in this case well beyond that which is normally experienced in
most cases of removal.” Id. at 471.
96. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), 1229b(b).
97. Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 583 (B.I.A. 1978) (affirming that the
alien’s 12 years of residence in the United States did not sufficiently offset his
conviction as a drug offender to warrant relief, especially given his failure to ad-
vance substantial equities because he was single, childless, and had no relatives in
the country).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id. § 1229(a).  The other information that must be specified in the notice
includes the following:  “the legal authority under which the proceedings are con-
ducted,” the alleged violations of the law, “[t]he charges against the alien,” that the
alien is permitted to secure legal representation, contact information requirements,
and the consequences of failing to appear at the proceedings. Id.
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fied in the INA activates the stop-time rule and effectively ends the
period of continuous residence.102  In deference to the BIA, the
First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits have held
that continuous residence stops accruing when the individual re-
ceives an NTA, regardless of whether the notice includes the date
and time of the removal hearing.103  The Third Circuit has declined
to defer to the BIA, instead holding that the statute is unambiguous
and that an NTA must specify the date and time of the removal
hearing to activate the stop-time rule.104
1. The Seminal Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
a. Key Facts
In Camarillo, Judith Elma Camarillo, a Guatemalan citizen
who had been an LPR since 2000, received an NTA on August 29,
2005.105  The NTA indicated that the hearing time was yet to be
determined.106  The NTA was later filed with an Immigration
Court, which issued a notice of hearing on November 9, 2007.107
The immigration judge found Camarillo removable based on
her conviction for alien smuggling but granted her application for
cancellation of removal.108  The immigration judge concluded that
Camarillo had accrued the required seven years of continuous resi-
dence beginning from the adjustment of her status to LPR on Au-
gust 7, 2000 to her receipt of the notice of hearing on November 9,
2007 (as opposed to her receipt of the NTA in 2005).109  The DHS
appealed, contending that Camarillo was ineligible for cancellation
of removal because § 1229b(d)(1) of the INA, i.e., the stop-time
rule, “provides that any period of continuous residence ends ‘when
the alien is served a [NTA].’”110  Thus, even without the date and
time of the hearing in the NTA, Camarillo’s continuous residence
should have ended when the government served the NTA on Au-
gust 29, 2005.111  The BIA found for the DHS.112
102. See infra Part II.E.3.
103. See infra Part II.E.2.
104. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 2016); see infra
Part II.E.3.
105. Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 644 (B.I.A. 2011).
106. Id.
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b. Determination of Ambiguity
The Board’s analysis in Camarillo involved first determining
whether the language at issue, specifically § 1229(b)(d)(1) and
§ 1229(a)(1), had a plain and unambiguous meaning.113  In refer-
ence to principles of statutory construction, the Board stated that it
would determine the meaning of the language by relying upon the
“language itself, the specific context in which that language [was]
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”114
The Board stated that, although the immigration judge’s read-
ing was plausible, an “equally plausible reading” was that the refer-
ence in § 1229b(d)(1) to an NTA “under section [1229(a)]” was
simply definitional and functioned only to clarify to what “notice to
appear” referred.115  In other words, the reference to § 1229(a) was
meant only to identify the document the DHS must serve “to trig-
ger the ‘stop-time rule’ and does not impose substantive require-
ments for a [NTA] to be effective in order for that trigger to
occur.”116  In light of these multiple possible readings of
§ 1229b(d)(1) and § 1229(a), the Board found the statute to be
ambiguous.117
c. Section 1229(a) as the Primary Reference to the NTA
The Board determined that the best reading of § 1229(a) was
that Congress intended the phrase “under section [1229(a)]” to
serve as a definition and “specify the document the DHS must
serve on the alien to trigger the ‘stop-time rule.’”118  The Board
also held that, “Section [1229(a)] is the primary reference in the Act
to the [NTA],” thus defining the written notice that must be served
on the alien to place him or her in removal proceedings.119
d. Breadth of Reference to Section 1229(a)
The Board cited the reference to the entirety of § 1229(a) as
support for the definitional reading of the stop-time rule.120  Sec-
tion 1229(a)(1) describes the notice of the date and time of hearing,
which are often subject to change.121  Section 1229(a)(2) addresses
113. Id. at 646.
114. Id. at 646 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
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this indefiniteness, establishing the procedure for providing notice
in case of such changes.122  The Board stated that § 1229(a)(2) indi-
cated that “Congress envisioned that circumstances beyond the
control of the DHS would require a change in the hearing date and
specifically provided that such notification could occur after the is-
suance of the [NTA].”123
e. Agency Regulations
As additional support, the Board looked to DOJ regulations,
which provided that the date and time of removal proceedings
would be specified in the NTA only “where practicable.”124  In
those cases where the date and time were yet to be determined and
not listed in the NTA, the Immigration Court would schedule the
hearing and provide notice accordingly.125
f. Legislative History
The Board also referred to legislative history behind the stop-
time rule, which was enacted through IIRIRA, showing that the
stop-time rule was established to address “perceived abuses arising
from the prior practice of allowing periods of continuous physical
presence to accrue after service of a charging document.”126  The
Board found that Congress intended to “prevent aliens from being
able to ‘buy time,’ during which they could acquire a period of con-
tinuous presence that would qualify them for forms of relief that
were unavailable to them when proceedings were initiated.”127
Further guidance was found in the Congressional Record, spe-
cifically in an explanatory memorandum prepared by the Senate
Committee on Appropriations:
Under the rules in effect before [enactment of the “stop-time”
rule], [an] otherwise eligible person could qualify for suspension
of deportation if he had been continuously physically present in
the United States for seven years, regardless of whether or when
the Immigration and Naturalization Service had initiated depor-
tation proceedings against the person through the issuance of an
order to show cause . . . to that person.128
122. Id. at 647–48.
123. Id. at 648.
124. Id. at 648 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) (2011)).
125. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 648.
126. Id. at 649.
127. Id. (quoting Matter of Cisneros, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668, 670 (B.I.A. 2004)).
128. Id. at 649–50 (quoting Matter of Nolasco, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 640–41
(B.I.A. 1999)).
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The BIA stated that this legislative history supported Congressional
intent “for the ‘stop-time rule’ to break an alien’s continuous resi-
dence or physical presence in the United States” upon issuance of
the charging document.129  The Board reasoned that scheduling in-
formation, such as the date and time of the hearing, was not infor-
mation required to accomplish the key purpose of an NTA, which
was to provide notice to an alien that the government intended to
initiate removal proceedings and remove the alien from the
country.130
g. Division of Responsibilities between the DHS and
Immigration Court
Finally, the Board relied on the delineation of responsibilities
between the DHS and Immigration Court.131  The DHS frequently
serves NTAs where there is “no immediate access to docketing in-
formation” and thus with no hearing date and time specified in the
NTA.132  The Immigration Court is responsible for sending a subse-
quent notice of hearing to notify the noncitizen of the hearing date
and time.133  Nothing indicated that “Congress would have ex-
pected that scheduling delays . . . or other administrative issues
would affect when an alien’s continuous residence or physical pres-
ence [ended] for purposes of eligibility for relief from removal.”134
2. The Majority Approach
a. Fourth Circuit
In Urbina v. Holder,135 a citizen of Nicaragua entered the
United States on October 4, 2000 on a tourist visa and overstayed
its expiration.136  Just before ten years could accrue to meet the res-
idence requirement, the DHS served Urbina with an NTA in De-
cember 2009.137  However, the charges noted on the NTA were
related to illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a),138 and not illegal
129. Id. at 650.
130. Id.
131. Id.




135. Urbina v. Holder, 745 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2014).
136. Id. at 736.
137. Id. at 738.
138. Urbina was charged with entering the country without being admitted,
which was apparently based on his prior applications for temporary protected sta-
tus in which he asserted that he had entered the country in 1998. Id.  Admission
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presence, which would have been the correct charge.139  Similar to
the NTA in Camarillo,140 the NTA also noted that the date and
time for the hearing were “to be set.”141
At the removal hearing, Urbina asserted that he had entered
the United States legally in 2000 on a tourist visa, and so the correct
charge was illegal presence, not illegal entry.142  He then requested
the DHS to amend the NTA with the correct charge, which the
DHS eventually did at a later hearing after Urbina produced his
passport and visa.143  Urbina responded to the amended NTA by
stating that his original NTA was invalid.144  He contended that
“only the newly substituted [correct] charge stopped the clock, and
it did so after he had reached the ten-year mark, making him eligi-
ble for cancellation of removal.”145  Additionally, he noted that the
date and time were not specified in the NTA, as required by 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).146  The immigration judge found for the DHS,
and the BIA dismissed Urbina’s appeal.147
The Fourth Circuit referred to the BIA’s decision in Camarillo,
analyzing the Board’s interpretation in accordance with the Chev-
ron doctrine.148  The court agreed with the BIA that the relevant
statutory provision was ambiguous in that both the BIA’s and
Urbina’s readings were plausible.149  Given this finding of ambigu-
ity, the court proceeded to the second step under Chevron and de-
termined that the BIA’s interpretation in Camarillo was plausible
based on the reasons provided by the agency.150  Applying this in-
terpretation to Urbina’s original NTA, the court held that the no-
refers to “the lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(13)(A) (2012).
139. Urbina, 745 F.3d at 738.
140. Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 644 (B.I.A. 2011).





146. Id. at 739.
147. Id. at 738.
148. Id. at 740 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  The Chevron doctrine is applied “when a court reviews
an agency’s construction of a statute” the agency is responsible for administering.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.  The analysis is a two-step inquiry:  1) determining
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” which
requires the court and agency to give effect to the “unambiguously expressed in-
tent” of Congress; and 2) if the statutory text is silent or ambiguous, determining
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
149. Urbina, 745 F.3d at 740.
150. Id.
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tice nevertheless triggered the stop-time rule even with the
incorrect charge and missing date and time.151
b. Seventh Circuit
In Yi Di Wang v. Holder,152 Wang, a Chinese citizen, was
smuggled into the U.S. Virgin Islands on September 27, 1999.153
Immigration authorities took him into custody two days later on
September 29, 1999 and subsequently served him with an NTA with
the hearing date and time “to be set later.”154
The Immigration Court made two attempts to notify Wang of
his hearing schedule, with neither notice being properly served.155
Wang ultimately failed to appear for his hearing and, a few months
later, in November 1999, the government requested the immigra-
tion judge to administratively close the case.156
In October 2009, after ten years of avoiding immigration au-
thorities in the United States, Wang voluntarily requested the Im-
migration Court to reschedule his removal proceedings.157  At a
hearing in March 2010, Wang conceded removability.158  At a later
hearing, in November 2012,159 Wang then submitted an application
for cancellation of removal.160  The immigration judge denied that
application because Wang “lacked the required 10 years of continu-
ous presence in the United States.”161  The judge ruled that Wang’s
“qualifying time ended . . . when he was served with a [NTA] just
two days after his arrival.”162  Wang appealed to the BIA, which
relied on Camarillo in dismissing the appeal.163
Wang’s primary argument before the Seventh Circuit was that
the Board erred in relying “on a defective [NTA] to cut off his con-
tinuous presence in the United States” in concluding that he was
151. Id.
152. Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2014).
153. Id. at 671.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 671–72.
156. Id. at 672.
157. Id.
158. Wang also stated that he planned to seek a U Visa (available to nonci-
tizens who are victims of certain crimes and likely to be helpful in the prosecution
and investigation of those crimes), as well as asylum and relief under the Conven-
tion Against Torture. Id.
159. Another hearing was held between March 2010 and November 2012, in
which the immigration judge allowed Wang additional time to continue pursuing a
U Visa and decide on other forms of relief. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Wang, 759 F.3d at 672.
163. Id.
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ineligible for cancellation of removal.164  The court noted that
Chevron deference applied because Wang was challenging “the
Board’s authoritative interpretation of immigration laws.”165
As a starting point, under Chevron’s first step of determining
ambiguity, the court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Urbina, which had already determined that § 1229b(d)(1) did not
resolve “whether an alien’s continuous presence in the United
States [could] be halted by a [NTA] that [lacked] the date and time
of a hearing.”166  The court agreed that the statute contained “noth-
ing about whether a[n] [NTA] . . . must include the date and time of
a hearing” to trigger the stop-time rule, and so the interpretations
advanced by both Wang and the government were plausible.167  Be-
cause of this ambiguity, Wang could not prevail under Chevron’s
first step.168  Proceeding to Chevron’s second step, the court reiter-
ated the reasons provided by the BIA for its interpretation that an
NTA that did not specify the hearing date and time still triggered
the stop-time rule.169  The court concluded that this was a “permis-
sible construction of the statute” that required deference under
Chevron, and ultimately denied Wang’s petition.170
c. Sixth Circuit
In Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder,171 Jorge Alberto Gonzalez-Gar-
cia (“Gonzalez”), a Mexican citizen, lawfully entered the country
with a temporary-visitor visa on September 25, 1999.172  In June
2009, three months prior to his ten-year anniversary in the country,
police arrested Gonzalez for driving without a license.173  An immi-
gration enforcement agent at the county sheriff’s office, reporting
that Gonzalez had crossed the border illegally,174 served Gonzalez
with an NTA.175  The NTA did not provide any information as to
the location, date, and time of the removal proceedings.176
164. Id. at 673.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 674.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 674–75.
170. Id. at 675.
171. Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, 770 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2014).
172. Id. at 432.
173. Id. at 433.
174. The government initially charged Gonzalez with illegal entry, which
Gonzalez later disputed.  The government then responded with “additional
charges of inadmissibility/deportability” on January 12, 2011, stating that Gonzalez
had overstayed his visa. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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After the immigration judge found that Gonzalez had over-
stayed his visa, Gonzalez applied for cancellation of removal.177
His application asserted that his NTA had two defects:  it had not
specified the time and place of the proceedings in violation of
§ 1229(a), and the government could not sustain its charge of illegal
entry therein.178  Gonzalez contended that these defects rendered
the NTA invalid; thus, it was not until January of 2011, when the
notice was corrected, that the stop-time rule was triggered.179  The
immigration judge, and later the BIA, relied on Camarillo and
found for the DHS, stating that these defects did not block the stop-
time rule.180
Under Chevron, the Sixth Circuit recognized that Gonzalez’s
interpretation was not the only possible interpretation of the statu-
tory provision.181  Proceeding to the next step of the analysis, the
court stated that the BIA’s interpretation of the provision was rea-
sonable based on the agency’s reasoning in Camarillo.182  Thus, the
court dismissed Gonzalez’s petition for review, finding that the
DHS had served the NTA within the required period of time to
trigger the stop-time rule, regardless of the defects cited by
Gonzalez.183
d. Second Circuit
In Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch,184 Klever Bolivar Guaman-Yuqui
(“Guaman”), a citizen of Ecuador, improperly entered the United
States (i.e., without inspection) on January 14, 2001.185  On March
15, 2010, the DHS served him with an NTA for removability.186
The notice indicated that his hearing would be held “on a date to be
set at a time to be set.”187  Following this notice, the Immigration
Court sent Guaman a notice of hearing on April 30, 2010.188  How-
ever, Guaman was not present at the hearing, and the immigration





181. Gonzalez-Garcia, 770 F.3d at 434.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 435.
184. Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2015).
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Guaman filed a motion to reopen a few months later, and the
BIA reopened the hearing based on evidence that the NTA had
been mailed to an incorrect address.190  In September of 2011, the
Immigration Court served Guaman with a new notice of hearing
indicating the date and time for his appearance.191  At his proceed-
ings, Guaman applied for cancellation of removal.192
The immigration judge denied Guaman’s application, finding
that he was ineligible for relief because he had not satisfied the ten-
year requirement for continuous physical presence in the United
States.193  This finding was based on Guaman’s entry into the coun-
try on January 14, 2001 and his receipt of the NTA and notice of
hearing on March 15, 2010 and April 30, 2010, respectively.194
Guaman subsequently filed an appeal with the BIA, which relied
on Camarillo, concluding that the stop-time rule was triggered
when the DHS served Guaman with the NTA on March 15, 2010.195
Similar to the approach used in three sister circuits, the Second
Circuit found the statute ambiguous due to its multiple possible
readings, thus deferring to the BIA’s construction in Camarillo
under the Chevron doctrine.196  The court found that the reasons
provided by the BIA reasonably supported its interpretation of
§ 1229b(d)(1), “respecting both the broader structure of the INA
and the extensive evidence of legislative intent.”197
e. Ninth Circuit
In Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch,198 Jorge Mario Moscoso-
Castellanos (“Moscoso”), a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United
States in April 1997.199  On April 7, 2005, the DHS served him with
an NTA, which indicated that the proceedings would be held “on a
date to be set at a time to be set.”200  Moscoso later received the
hearing notice with the scheduling information and appeared
before an immigration judge on April 20, 2005.201  The DHS served





194. Guaman-Yuqui, 786 F.3d at 237.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 238.
197. Id. at 240.
198. Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
199. Id. at 1081.
200. Id. at 1081–82.
201. Id. at 1082.
202. Id.
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application for cancellation of removal on August 24, 2011.203  The
immigration judge found Moscoso ineligible for relief given that
only eight years had elapsed between his arrival in 1997 and service
of the NTA in 2005.204  The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s
finding, relying once again on Camarillo.205
On appeal, Moscoso asserted that Camarillo was not control-
ling, and that he had accrued continuous physical presence in the
United States until he was issued the corrected NTA in 2008.206
Moscoso relied on Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales207 for the proposi-
tion that “an NTA triggers the stop-time rule only if it includes the
date and location of the removal hearing.”208
The Ninth Circuit stated that it was bound to the BIA’s inter-
pretation of an ambiguous statute, “even if that interpretation con-
flicts with [the court’s] earlier interpretation of the same
provision.”209  The court thus proceeded under Chevron, first find-
ing that the provision was subject to multiple interpretations and
was consequently ambiguous.210  Under the second step of the
court’s Chevron analysis, the court found that the interpretation of
the stop-time rule and the underlying reasoning provided in
Camarillo were reasonable.211  The court specifically recognized
that it was joining several of its sister circuits in deferring to the
BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule.212
Applying the BIA’s reading to Moscoso’s case, the court found
that Moscoso stopped accruing physical presence on April 7, 2005
upon service of the original NTA.213  He had accumulated only
eight years of physical presence at that point, and so he was statuto-





207. Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2005).
208. Moscoso-Castellanos, 803 F.3d at 1082 (citing Garcia-Ramirez, 423 F.3d
at 937).
209. Id. (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 984–85 (2005)).
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f. First Circuit
In Pereira v. Sessions,215 Wescley Fonseca Pereira (“Pereira”),
a Brazilian citizen, overstayed his non-immigrant visitor visa.216  He
had been admitted to the United States in June 2000, and was au-
thorized to stay only until December 21, 2000.217  In 2006, Pereira
was served with a notice to appear, which did not specify the date
and time of his removal hearing.218  In 2007, over a year later, the
Immigration Court mailed a notice to Pereira setting his removal
hearing for October 31, 2007.219  However, Pereira never received
the notice because it was sent to his street address on Martha’s
Vineyard instead of his post office box.220  Pereira failed to appear
at his hearing, and the immigration judge ordered his removal in
absentia.221
However, Pereira was not removed from the country.222  In
2013, over five years later, Pereira was arrested for a motor vehicle
violation and subsequently detained by the DHS.223  By this point,
he had been in the United States for about 13 years.224  Pereira had
his removal proceedings reopened, claiming he had not received the
hearing notice from 2007.225
At the hearing, Pereira conceded removability, seeking cancel-
lation of removal based on the “defective” notice.226  The immigra-
tion judge found Pereira ineligible for relief because he could not
establish the requisite ten years of continuous physical presence.227
On appeal, Pereira conceded to the BIA that “Camarillo foreclosed
his argument that the stop-time rule did not cut off his period of
continuous physical presence until 2013, but argued that Camarillo
should be reconsidered and overruled.”228  The BIA declined, in-
stead affirming the immigration judge’s decision.229
215. Pereira v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) cert. granted, No. 17-459,
2018 WL 386567 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018).
216. Id. at 2.
217. Id.
218. Id.  The notice to appear merely stated that Pereira was to appear at an
immigration court in Boston “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2–3.
221. Id. at 3.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2–3.
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In Pereira’s subsequent appeal, the First Circuit, like its sister
circuits, applied the Chevron doctrine.230  For the first step of deter-
mining whether the statute is ambiguous as to whether an NTA that
lacks all the elements listed in the statute interrupts a noncitizen’s
physical presence in the country, Pereira relied on a Third Circuit
case decided in 2017, Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney-General of the
United States.231  The First Circuit disagreed with the Third Circuit’s
holding that the stop-time rule unambiguously states that an NTA
with omitted information cuts off a noncitizen’s continuous physical
presence.232  The First Circuit reasoned:
It is undisputed that § 1229(a)(1) creates a duty requiring the
government to provide an alien with the information listed in
that provision.  But whether a notice to appear that omits some
of this information nonetheless triggers the stop-time rule is a
different question.  As the Seventh Circuit has observed, even if
such an omission renders a notice to appear defective, “a defec-
tive document [may] nonetheless serve[ ] a useful purpose.”233
Thus, finding the statute ambiguous under the first step of
Chevron, the First Circuit proceeded to the second step—determin-
ing whether the BIA’s interpretation in Camarillo was permissi-
ble.234  The First Circuit agreed with the thrust of the BIA’s
reasoning, finding that “[i]n light of the relevant text, statutory
structure, administrative context, and legislative history, the BIA’s
construction of the stop-time rule is neither arbitrary and capricious
nor contrary to the statute.”235  In doing so, the First Circuit ac-
knowledged it was joining the five other circuits that had deferred
to the BIA’s interpretation in Camarillo.236  In deferring to the
BIA, the court affirmed that Pereira was ineligible for cancellation
of removal.237
3. The Lone Third Circuit
Breaking from its sister circuits, the Third Circuit, in Orozco-
Velasquez, held that an NTA which failed to provide a correct ad-
230. Id. at 4.
231. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2016); see infra Part
II.E.3.
232. Pereira, 866 F.3d at 5.
233. Id. (citing Wang v. Holder, 759 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2014)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 8.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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dress for the Immigration Court did not trigger the stop-time
rule.238
a. Key Facts
In September 1998 or February 1999, Milton Orozco-Velas-
quez (“Orozco”), a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States
without being admitted or paroled.239  The DHS served him with
his NTA on May 9, 2008, which provided that the date and time of
proceedings were “to be set,” and that the proceedings would be in
Elizabeth, New Jersey.240  On April 7, 2010, the DHS mailed an-
other NTA, correcting the location of the proceedings to Newark,
New Jersey.241  On April 12, 2010, Orozco was served with a notice
of hearing, which indicated the date and time of his hearing.242  On
May 14, 2010, Orozco applied for cancellation of removal and
moved to terminate removal proceedings.243
Orozco contended that the NTA from April 2010 superseded
the NTA from May 2008, and so he had accrued the required ten
years of continuous residence in the United States.244  However, the
immigration judge agreed with the government that the subsequent
NTA from April 2010 did not supersede the earlier NTA and,
therefore, ordered Orozco’s removal.245  The BIA dismissed the en-
suing appeal, once again relying on Camarillo.246  While the BIA
acknowledged that the Camarillo defect, i.e., the omission of the
date and time of the hearing, was different from providing an incor-
rect court address, the BIA nevertheless applied Camarillo to bar
Orozco’s application for relief.247  The BIA also cited a DOJ regu-
lation in support of its determination that an NTA was not defec-
tive based merely on the omission of the date, time, or place of the
proceedings.248  The DOJ regulation provided for an NTA amend-
ment to “add[ ] or substitute[ ] charges of inadmissibility and/or de-
portability and/or factual allegations”.249
238. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2016).
239. Id. at 79.  The earlier date of entry was provided by Orozco-Velasquez;
the later one was identified by the immigration judge, but described by the BIA as
“perhaps an incorrect date.” Id. at 85 n.4.




244. Id. at 79–80.
245. Id. at 80.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Orozco-Velasquez, 817 F.3d at 80.
249. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (2015)).
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On appeal, the Third Circuit determined that the BIA’s con-
clusion, i.e., failing to specify the time or place of proceedings in an
NTA did not render it ineffective, conflicted with the INA’s plain
text and was thus not entitled to Chevron deference.250  Finding no
ambiguity and relying primarily on the plain text of the statute, as
well as other textual and policy considerations, the Third Circuit
held that an NTA served under § 1229(a) triggers the stop-time rule
“only when it includes each of the items that Congress instructs
‘shall be given in person to the alien.’”251
b. Plain Text of § 1229(a)
The court explained that the stop-time rule specifically incor-
porates the requirements listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) using the
word “shall,”252 which the court characterized as “the language of
command.”253  The court referenced Black’s Law Dictionary, which
defines “shall” as “a duty to; more broadly, is required to,” and
characterized this “most common usage” as “the mandatory sense
that drafters typically intend[,] and that courts typically uphold” in
statutes.254  In the absence of a conflict with a canon of statutory
construction, the court thus presumes that when Congress uses
“shall,” the language is a mandatory instruction.255  The court con-
cluded that, “an alien’s period of continuous residence is inter-
rupted, that is, time stops, only when the government serves an
NTA complying with the listed requirements under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a).”256
c. Incorporation of § 1229(a) in its Entirety
The court also recognized that the stop-time rule encompasses
more than just the NTA requirements listed in § 1229(a)(1),257
which the BIA had relied on in its reasoning to support its defini-
tional reading of the stop-time rule in Camarillo.258  However, the
court did not view this additional inclusion as diminishing “the
clear-cut command set out in § 1229(a)(1) that notice ‘shall be
250. Id. at 81–82.
251. Id. at 83 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012)).
252. Id. at 82 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)).
253. Id. at 83 (quoting Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001)).
254. Id. (quoting Shall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 83.
257. Id. at 82.
258. See supra Part II.E.1.
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given in person to the alien . . . specifying,’ inter alia, ‘[t]he time and
place at which the proceedings will be held.’”259
d. Policy Considerations
Finally, the court noted that the NTA’s purpose is to provide
an alien with notice of the charges against him and fundamental
information on related proceedings.260  In taking the government’s
“counter-textual mode of providing notice” to its logical conclusion,
the court determined that the BIA’s approach may treat even an
NTA “containing no information whatsoever as a ‘stop-time’ trig-
ger, permitting the government to fill in the blanks (or not) at some
unknown time in the future.”261
III. ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit in Orozco-Velasquez emphasized that
“[u]nder Chevron, the statute’s plain meaning controls, whatever
the [BIA] might have to say,” unless the law does not speak clearly
on the issue, in which case a court must defer to the BIA’s reasona-
ble interpretation.262  The analysis begins with the plain text of the
relevant statutory provisions, followed by statutory context, and fi-
nally, policy considerations.
A. Plain Meaning of Statutory Text
When interpreting a statute,263 the starting point is “the lan-
guage of the statute itself.  Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.”264  Revisiting the stop-time rule in the INA, the rele-
vant text states:
259. Orozco-Velasquez, 817 F.3d at 83 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i)
(2012)).
260. Id. at 84.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 81 (citing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203
(2014)).
263. Statutory interpretation involves reading “the whole statutory text, con-
sidering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or
authorities that inform the analysis.”  Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486
(2006).  Interpretation involves the use of canons “developed by the judiciary that
focus on word usage, grammar, syntax[,] and the like.” LARRY M. EIG, CONG.
RES. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS 2 (2011).  Courts can also consider “various presumptions that reflect
broader judicial concerns and can more directly favor particular substantive re-
sults[,]” as well as legislative history. Id.
264. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)
(quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980)).  Using statutory text as a starting point highlights the “primacy of
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[A]ny period of continuous residence or continuous physical
presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when
the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this
title . . . .265
Section 1229(a) referenced in the text above encompasses sub-
sections relating to the NTA,266 notice of change in time or place of
proceedings,267 and maintenance of central address files.268  Section
1229(a)(1) states that:
In removal proceedings under [section 1229a], written notice . . .
shall be given in person to the alien . . . specifying the following:
[t]he nature of the proceedings against the alien . . . [t]he charges
against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have
been violated . . . [t]he time and place at which the proceedings
will be held (emphasis added).269
The use of “shall” in both §§ 1229b(d)(1) and 1229(a)(1) con-
veys a mandatory instruction consistent with the ordinary usage of
the word270 and comports with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
Orozco-Velasquez.271
While the stop-time rule does incorporate the entirety of
§ 1229(a), as opposed to incorporating only § 1229(a)(1) which en-
compasses NTAs, this incorporation does nothing to diminish the
government’s duty to specify the information listed in the statute as
part of providing appropriate notice to the noncitizen of the re-
moval proceedings.272  The reference to § 1229(a) compels the gov-
ernment to comply with each of the NTA requirements specifically
listed, while recognizing that the schedule of removal proceedings is
subject to change and subsequently accommodates that change.273
Yet nothing in the stop-time rule itself supports the position that
text” as expressed in the plain meaning rule, which states that “where the language
of a statute is plain, the sole role of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms.”  Eig, supra note 264, at 41.
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
266. Id. § 1229(a)(1).
267. Id. § 1229(a)(2).
268. Id. § 1229(a)(3).
269. Id. § 1229(a)(1) (emphasis added).
270. “[The] mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to
judicial discretion.”  Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)).
271. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Shall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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serving an NTA that does not provide the hearing date altogether
still suspends the noncitizen’s accrued continuous residence.
Furthermore, the provision allowing for “any change or post-
ponement in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” requires
a written notice specifying “the new time or place of the proceed-
ings.”274  Use of the words “postponement” and “new” presupposes
that the scheduling information was initially provided.  Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “postpone” as “to change the date or time . . . to
a later one.”275  Similarly, “new” is defined as “changed from the
former state.”276  In other words, if one is changing or postponing
an event and rescheduling it for a different date, the new date re-
places the earlier date provided.  One cannot be said to postpone an
event or provide a new date if no earlier date was initially provided.
The NTAs provided to the noncitizens in the cases applying the
majority approach did not even specify a time in the first instance,
merely stating that the time remained to be determined.277  Omit-
ting the time of proceedings is altogether different from providing
an initial time and subsequently updating it due to scheduling con-
siderations.  Reading the stop-time rule along with the sections ref-
erenced therein supports the interpretation that, in order to
interrupt a noncitizen’s period of continuous residence, notice must
be provided such that the listed statutory requirements are met.
B. Statutory Context
1. Other Sections of the Statute
Looking to other portions of the statute278 related to removal
and removal proceedings, certain provisions employ the word
“practicable” for some allowance in certain areas and have ex-
pressed it accordingly.  For instance, when initiating removal pro-
ceedings, § 1229 states that, “In removal proceedings under § 1229a
of this title, written notice . . . shall be given in person to the alien
(or, if personal service is not practicable, through service by mail to
the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record, if any) . . . .”279  Similar
language is employed in the statute where notice must be sent re-
274. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2) (emphasis added).
275. Postponement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2010)).
276. New, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2010)).
277. See supra Part II.E.
278. The whole act rule of statutory construction urges “look[ing] to the pro-
visions of the whole law, and to its object and policy,” rather than examining a
particular section “in isolation from the context of the whole [statute].”  United
States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)).
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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garding a change in the time or place of proceedings.280  Addition-
ally, in the context of removing criminal noncitizens, the statute
states that the Attorney General “shall, to the maximum extent
practicable, detain [an alien convicted of an aggravated felony who
is taken into custody by the Attorney General] at a facility at which
other such aliens are detained.”281
Congress could easily have used similar language to recognize
that including hearing scheduling information as part of providing
notice to the noncitizen may not always be practicable,282 and so an
NTA without it could still trigger the stop-time rule and effectively
end the noncitizen’s period of continuous residence in the country.
Congress could have expressed that intent, as it did in other provi-
sions of the statute, and yet it did not.283
2. Legislative History
Referring to legislative history,284 the Third Circuit pointed out
that the only legislative history the Guaman-Yuqui court identified
(which the BIA relied on in deciding Camarillo285) was an explana-
tory memorandum submitted by five senators to accompany an om-
nibus appropriations bill amending the ‘stop-time’ rule:286
The memorandum . . . purports to explain why Congress enacted
the “stop-time” provision in the first place (to alter a status quo
in which “people were able to accrue time toward the [then-
]seven-year continuous physical presence requirement after they
already had been placed in deportation proceedings”), but no-
280. Id. § 1229(a)(2).
281. Id. § 1228 (emphasis added).
282. Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 650 (B.I.A. 2011).
283. E.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252 (2010)
(comparing two ERISA provisions on attorney’s fees, where one used the words
“prevailing party” and the other did not, and finding that “the contrast between
these two paragraphs makes clear that Congress knows how to impose express
limits on the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases”); Meghrig v. KFC W.,
Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (comparing CERCLA and RCRA citizen suit provi-
sions, where CERCLA expressly permitted the recovery of any “necessary costs of
response, incurred by any . . . person” and RCRA did not, and concluding that
Congress “demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery
of cleanup costs” but chose not to provide for that remedy under RCRA).
284. Reliance on legislative history varies among courts, and may depend on
factors such as the nature of the issue, the clarity and complexity of a statute, and
surrounding circumstances of the statute’s passage.  Eig, supra note 264, at 44.
While recognizing that legislative history does play a role in statutory interpreta-
tion to the extent that it sheds light on congressional intent, the Supreme Court has
expressed that “the authoritative statement is [still] the statutory text.”  Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
285. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 649.
286. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 85 n.33 (3d Cir. 2016).
2018] STOPPING THE CLOCK 797
where addresses whether service of a defective NTA bears the
same “stop-time” consequences as a NTA that complies with
§ 1229(a)(1).287
The BIA in Camarillo also relied on legislative history reflect-
ing that the stop-time rule was established to address “perceived
abuses arising from the prior practice of allowing periods of contin-
uous physical presence to accrue after service of a charging docu-
ment.”288  These abuses included noncitizens in deportation
proceedings “knowingly fil[ing] meritless applications for relief”
and “exploit[ing] administrative delays in the hearing and appeal
processes” to “buy time” and eventually qualify for relief that was
not previously available.289  However, delays may also arise from
other factors unrelated to the noncitizen’s conduct, such as errors
on the part of the government, as in some of the cases described
earlier.290
For instance, Guaman was initially ordered removed after fail-
ing to appear at his hearing, but the BIA later reopened his case on
evidence that the notice of hearing291 had been sent to an incorrect
mailing address and subsequently returned as undeliverable.292  The
Immigration Court later sent Guaman a new notice of hearing, at
which point he had already accrued the required continuous resi-
dence period but through no improperly motivated conduct of his
own.293
In other sections, the statute addresses the situation in which a
noncitizen fails to provide address information with the possible in-
tent of delaying proceedings and evading receiving notice in order
to accrue the required period of continuous residence.294  The stat-
ute states that the NTA shall specify:
a) The requirement that the alien must immediately provide (or
have provided) the Attorney General with a written record of an
address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may be
contacted respecting [removal] proceedings under section
1229a.295
287. Id. (citation omitted).
288. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 649.
289. In re Cisneros-Gonzalez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668, 670 (B.I.A. 2004).
290. See supra Part II.E.2.
291. The notice of hearing supplemented the NTA, which had indicated only
that the hearing was “on a date to be set at a time to be set.”  Guaman-Yuqui v.
Lynch, 786 F.3d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 2015).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)–(iii) (2012); id. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).
295. Id. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i) (emphasis added).
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b) The requirement that the alien must provide the Attorney
General immediately with a written record of any change of the
alien’s address or telephone number.296
c) The consequences . . . of failure to provide address and tele-
phone information.297
Failure by a noncitizen to attend a proceeding after receiving
notice will result in an order for removal if the government can es-
tablish that the written notice was provided,298 and that the nonci-
tizen is removable.299  In other words, if a noncitizen fails to
provide or update his contact information as required by the stat-
ute, written notice will no longer be required.300  Given that the
issues Congress was purportedly seeking to resolve, i.e., minimize
potential dilatory practices by noncitizens, are addressed in these
other sections of the statute, allowing NTAs with missing informa-
tion to trigger the stop-time rule would be erroneous.
C. Policy Considerations
Consistent with the Third Circuit’s policy argument, the NTA’s
primary purpose is “to provide an alien with notice of the charges
against him” as well as the fundamental information on the pro-
ceedings in relation to those charges.301  The approach adopted by
the BIA and other circuits condones the government’s “counter-
textual mode of providing notice” and, taking it to its logical con-
clusion, would allow the government to treat an NTA “containing
no information whatsoever as a ‘stop-time’ trigger,” allowing the
government to supply the missing information (or not) “at some
unknown time in the future.”302
Furthermore, the approach adopted by the Third Circuit to re-
quire NTAs to contain all the elements listed under the INA, in-
cluding the date and time of the hearing, serves the public policy of
encouraging both the DHS and Immigration Courts to schedule
and initiate removal proceedings in a timely manner.  This com-
ports with the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s primary
mission to “adjudicate immigration cases by fairly [and] expedi-
296. Id. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii).
297. Id. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(iii); id. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).
298. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).  The written notice will be considered sufficient if it
was sent to the most recent address provided by the alien under § 1229(a)(1)(F).
Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).
301. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 2016).
302. Id.
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tiously . . . administering the Nation’s immigration laws,”303 as well
as the DHS’s interest in national security and protecting the integ-
rity of our borders.304  While the government need not hold the
hearing immediately, scheduling the hearing and providing notice
to noncitizens facing the possibility of removal poses a minimal ad-
ministrative burden.
Finally, providing noncitizens with timely and complete infor-
mation regarding removal proceedings provides two primary bene-
fits to noncitizens, specifically allowing them to:  a) prepare for such
proceedings in the interest of fairness; and b) plan their lives with
greater certainty with respect to their families, property, and em-
ployment—and make arrangements accordingly.  Removal imposes
“a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to
stay and live and work in this land of freedom. . . . Meticulous care
must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that
liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.”305  For in-
stance, one way to ensure fairness is by guaranteeing that nonci-
tizens “have the opportunity to be represented by counsel,” and
providing reasonable time to noncitizens to seek counsel and “per-
mit counsel to prepare for the hearing.”306  In the interest of fair-
ness, full notice must therefore be given as specified under the INA
to permit the noncitizen to better prepare for removal proceedings.
Being given full notice of removal proceedings also allows
noncitizens to make necessary arrangements pertaining to their
families, property, employment, and other areas of their lives, in
order to lessen the harsh consequences associated with removal.  In
Camarillo and Orozco-Velasquez, for instance, two years had
lapsed between the service of NTA and issuance of a subsequent
document containing the hearing date and time.307  Over the course
of that time, noncitizens would be unable to consider timing in get-
ting their affairs in order in anticipation of removal proceedings and
possible removal.
D. Recommendation
Courts should adopt the approach of the Third Circuit such
that only an NTA (or NTA and a subsequent document to provide
303. EOIR Home, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.gov/
eoir (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
304. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 251 (2012).
305. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (recognizing the hardship
imposed on an individual by deportation).
306. Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2005).
307. Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 644 (B.I.A. 2011); Orozco-
Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2016).
800 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:767
any omitted information)308 containing all the information explic-
itly identified in the statute would be sufficient to suspend a nonci-
tizen’s continuous residence period.  Requiring an NTA to contain
all of the information listed in the statute comports with the plain
meaning of the text, statutory context, and policy considerations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit correctly held that an NTA must contain all
of the information listed in the INA in order for it to trigger the
stop-time rule and suspend a noncitizen’s continuous residence pe-
riod.  The statute’s text, including the specific provisions at issue
and other provisions throughout the statute, as well as legislative
history, support this conclusion.  While the INA provides for the
removal of noncitizens based on a determination of inadmissibility
or deportability, it also mandates specific procedures for executing
this process of removal.  The DHS must conform with the proce-
dures plainly established by Congress.
Allowing the DHS to omit information from the NTA that has
been explicitly required by the INA adversely affects noncitizens in
preparing for their removal proceedings and managing their affairs
in anticipation of possible removal.  Additionally, it opens the door
for bare NTAs with minimal information to trigger the stop-time
rule, allowing the government to supply the missing information at
an uncertain time, ultimately depriving the noncitizen of full notice
of the impending proceedings.  Thus, courts confronted with this
issue should consider the stop-time rule triggered and, subse-
quently, the noncitizen’s continuous residence period suspended,
only if the NTA complies with the statutory requirements.
308. See Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 645 (where the immigration judge con-
sidered continuous residence suspended upon noncitizen’s later receipt of notice of
hearing, which, together with the earlier NTA, provided all the information listed
under the INA).
